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SPEEDY TRIAL GUARANTEES IN PENNSYLVANIA:
THE IMPACT OF RULE 1100
INTRODUCTION
The importance of protecting a criminal defendant's constitu-
tional right1 to a speedy trial has long been recognized in Pennsyl-
vania.' And yet, the application of this constitutional mandate has
undergone an important evolution in the past year. Whereas many
jurisdictions have speedy trial statutes containing a definite time
period,3 previously Pennsylvania followed a balancing process 4 in
determining the majority of its speedy trial claims.5 Such an ap-
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides in part:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed ...
PA. CONST. art. I, § 9 provides in part:
In all criminal prosecutions the accused hath a right to be heard
by himself and his counsel, to demand the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, to meet the witnesses face to face, to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and,
in prosecutions by indictment or information, a speedy public trial
by an impartial jury of the vicinage ....
2. Commonwealth v. Hare, 2 Pa. D. & C.2d 726, 729 (C.P. Alleg.
1954).
3. The recent tendency is to employ a definite number of days or
months. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMVUM STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: STANDARDS RELATING TO SPEEDY TRIAL, § 2.1 at 14-
16 (Approved Draft 1968) [hereinafter cited as ABA SPEEDY TRIAL STAND-
ARDS]; CAL. PEN. CODE § 1382(2) (West 1973) (60 days); 33 FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 3.191 (Supp. 1973) (90 days misdemeanor, 180 days felony); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 795.2 (Supp. 1973) (60 days); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3402 (Supp.
1973) (180 days); N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 30.30 (McKinney Supp. 1973-
74) (period varies from 60 days to 6 months according to the degree of
the crime); WASH. REV. CODE 10.46.010 (1972) (60 days). While about one-
third of the states use the chronological standard, about forty per cent still
express the limitation by terms of court. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-3501
(1948) (one term); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.04 (1964) (one term); VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.1-191 (1960) (three or four terms). See also Common-
wealth v. Hamilton, 449 Pa. 297, 303 n.4, 297 A.2d 127, 130 n.4 (1972).
4. The United States Supreme Court has only recently specifically
identified the factors to be balanced in determining whether a particular
defendant's right to a speedy trial has been denied. See Barker v. Wingo,
407 U.S. 514 (1972). The considerations are: the length of the delay; the
reason for the delay; the defendant's assertion of his right; and the preju-
dice to the defendant.
5. It must be emphasized that all courts have had the tendency to
use a balancing test, when considering speedy trial claims, because of the
unique nature of this constitutional right. Unlike other constitutional
rights the denial of a speedy trial may work to a defendant's benefit. Thus,
courts have found it necessary to consider numerous factors and, as a result,
a balancing rationale developed. The most profound articulation of this
proach, however, failed to eliminate criminal court backlogs and
adequately guard defendants' rights. In order to alleviate this
problem the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently declared:
[T]o more effectively protect the right of criminal de-
fendants to a speedy trial and also to help eliminate the
backlog in criminal cases in the courts of Pennsylvania we
deem it expedient to formulate a rule of criminal procedure
fixing a maximum time limit in which individuals accused
of crime shall be brought to trial, in the future, in this
Commonwealth.6
As result of this proclamation, the supreme court promulgated
Rule of Criminal Procedure 110Q. 7 This rule, unlike any former
logic is found in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) where the Court
stated:
A second difference between the right to a speedy trial and the
accused's other constitutional rights is that deprivation of the right
may work to the accused's advantage. Delay is not an uncommon
defense tactic. As the time between the commission of the crime
and trial lengthens, witnese may become unavailable or their
memories may fade. If the witnesses support the prosecution, its
case will be weakened, sometimes seriously so. And it is the pros-
ecution which carries the burden of proof. Thus, unlike the right
to counsel or the right to be free from compelled self-incrimina-
tion, deprivation of the right to speedy trial does not per se preju-
dice the accused's ability to defend himself.
Id. at 521.
6. Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 449 Pa. 297, 309-10, 297 A.2d 127, 133
(1972).
7. PA. R. CalM. P. 1100 PROMPT TRIAL provides:
(a) (1) Trial in a court case in which a written complaint
is filed against the defendant after June 30, 1973 but before July 1,
1974 shall commence no later than two hundred seventy (270)
days from the date on which the complaint is filed.
(2) Trial in a court case in which a written complaint is
filed against the defendant after June 30, 1974 shall com-
mence no later than one hundred eighty (180) days from
the date on which the complaint is filed.
(b) For the purpose of this Rule, trial shall be deemed to
commence on the date the trial judge calls the case to trial.
(c) At any time prior to the expiration of the period for
commencement of trial, the attorney for the Commonwealth may
apply to the court for an order extending the time for commence-
ment of trial. A copy of such application shall be served upon
the defendant through his attorney, if any, and the defendant shall
also have the right to be heard thereon. Such application shall
be granted only if trial cannot be commenced within the pre-
scribed period despite due diligence by the Commonwealth. Any
order granting such application shall specify the date or period
within which trial shall be commenced.
(d) In determining the period for commencement of trial,
there shall be excluded therefrom such period of delay at any
stage of the proceedings as results from:
(1) the unavailability of the defendant or his attorney;
(2) any continuance in excess of thirty (30) days granted
at the request of the defendant or his attorney, provided
that only the period beyond the thirtieth (30th) day shall
be so excluded;
(e) A new trial shall commence within a period of ninety
(90) days after the entry of an order by the trial court or an ap-
pellate court granting a new trial.
(f) At any time before trial, the defendant or his attorney
may apply to the court for an order dismissing the charges with
prejudice on the ground that this Rule has been violated. A copy
of such application shall be served upon the attorney for the Com-
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Pennsylvania statute or rule of court, provides for a fixed period
within which criminal trials must commence,8 without the necessity
of the defendant making a demand for trial. 9
This Comment will focus on the impact which Rule 1100 will
have on a criminal defendant's ability to obtain a speedy trial and
explore the broader effects this rule may have on Pennsylvania's
criminal justice system. In order to develop a meaningful com-
parison, it will be necessary to examine the procedures criminal
defendants formerly employed in attempting to obtain prompt ad-
judications.
I. SPEEDY TRIAL GUARANTEES PRIOR TO RULE 1100
As an aid to understanding the variety of arguments which
criminal defendants have presented when claiming the denial of a
speedy trial, this discussion is subdivided into four classes: (1) de-
fendants who have been indicted and are awaiting their initial trial;
(2) defendants who are incarcerated within Pennsylvania when ac-
cused; (3) defendants who are incarcerated in another jurisdiction
when accused; and (4) defendants who are awaiting a retrial. This
classification is helpful in examining Pennsylvania's pre-existing
rules and elucidates the changes inherent in the new provision.
A. Defendants Awaiting Initial Trial
Lengthy delays between the time of arrest and the time of trial
have led to a plethora of litigation in this Commonwealth.1" In
an attempt to expedite their prosecutions and in alleging the denial
monwealth, who shall also have the right to be heard thereon.
Any order granting such application shall dismiss the charges with
prejudice and discharge the defendant.
8. PA. R. CPlM. P. ll00(a) (1)-(a) (2).
9. See notes 58 and 76 and accompanying text infra.
10. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jones, 450 Pa. 442, 299 A.2d 288 (1973);
Commonwealth v. Bell, 442 Pa. 566, 276 A.2d 834 (1971); Commonwealth
v. Bittner, 441 Pa. 216, 272 A.2d 484 (1971); Commonwealth v. Stukes, 435
Pa. 535, 257 A.2d 828 (1969); Commonwealth ex tel. Demoss v. Cavell, 423
Pa. 597, 225 A.2d 673 (1967); Commonwealth v. Moncak, 375 Pa. 559, 101
A.2d 728 (1954); Commonwealth v. Halderman, 229 Pa. 198, 149 A. 476
(1930); Commonwealth v. Kirk, 220 Pa. Super. 115, 283 A.2d 712 (1971);
Commonwealth ex rel. Sukaly v. Moroney, 201 Pa. Super. 117, 191 A.2d 893
(1963); Commonwealth v. Meehan, 198 Pa. Super. 558, 182 A.2d 212 (1962);
Commonwealth ex ret. Graham v. Meyers, 194 Pa. Super. 561, 168 A.2d 796
(1961); Commonwealth ex rel. Hamilton v. Cavell, 188 Pa. Super. 161, 146
A.2d 373 (1958); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 153 Pa. Super. 582, 34 A.2d
905 (1943); Commonwealth v. Smith, 96 Dauph. 140 (Pa. C.P. 1973); Com-
monwealth v. Fox, 53 Pa. D. & C.2d 195 (C.P. Lycom. 1971); Common-
wealth v. Stewart, 51 Pa. D. & C.2d 560 (C.P. Bucks 1970); Commonwealth
ex rel. Burton v. Frame, 17 Chest. 42 (Pa. C.P. 1968); Commonwealth v.
Tacconelli, 16 Chest. 259 (Pa. C.P. 1968).
of a speedy trial, this class of criminal defendants has presented
three basic arguments. These arguments are not mutually exclu-
sive and have been presented in a variety of combinations.
The first argument is a broad constitutional attack based upon
the guarantee of the state constitution." Until recently it was held
that this guarantee did not warrant more than a discharge from
imprisonment, where indictment or trial was delayed. 12 However,
this position was undermined by Klopfer v. North Carolina1 3 where
the United States Supreme Court held that mere discharge from
custody does not satisfy constitutional guarantees of speedy trial.14
In compliance with this constitutional mandate, and in order to
analyze individual cases more thoroughly, the Pennsylvania courts
adopted a "balancing test,"'15 as suggested by the United States Su-
preme Court in Barker v. Wingo.'6 This balancing procedure was
recently utilized in Commonwealth v. Jones.17 In Jones, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court held that a lapse of thirty-two months be-
tween arrest and trial did not necessarily mean that the accused
had been denied a speedy trial, and that all factors creating this
delay had to be balanced.' 8
In the face of this balancing rationale requests for speedy trial
relief have often been denied. Such refusals have been attributed
to the accused's inability to show the requisite prejudice,19 his fail-
ure to demand trial at an early stage,20 or because of delays totally
beyond his control.21 Thus, this general constitutional argument
often failed and it became established that post-indictment delays,
of even several years, would not automatically entitle an accused
to relief.22 Only in exceptional cases has this purely constitutional
attack been successful.23  Accordingly, criminal defendants often
11. See note 1 supra.
12. Commonwealth ex rel. Graham v. Meyers, 194 Pa. Super. 561, 564,
168 A.2d 796, 797 (1961); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 153 Pa. Super. 582,
587, 34 A.2d 905, 907 (1943).
13. 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
14. Id. at 219-21.
15. See notes 4-5 supra.
16. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
17. 450 Pa. 442, 299 A.2d 288 (1973).
18. Id. at 446, 299 A.2d at 292.
19. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jones, 450 Pa. 442, 447, 299 A.2d 288,
291 (1973); Commonwealth v. Werner, 444 Pa. 458, 461, 282 A.2d 258, 261
(1971).
20. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Meehan, 198 Pa. Super. 558, 563, 182
A.2d 212, 215 (1962); Commonwealth v. Grant, 121 Pa. Super. 399, 406, 183
A. 663, 666 (1936).
21. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stukes, 435 Pa. 535, 546, 257 A-2d 828,
833 (1969); Commonwealth ex rel. Demoss v. Cavell, 423 Pa. 597, 601, 225
A.2d 673, 675 (1967). Such a delay may be caused by the necessity of trial
of co-conspirators prior to the accused.
22. Commonwealth v. Cardonick, 448 Pa. 322, 333, 292 A.2d 402, 408
(1972).




base their speedy trial claims on other grounds.
General constitutional arguments are often accompanied by the
invocation of Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 316.24 This
rule provides that if the defendant is not brought to trial within
a "reasonable time" after indictment, the court may order dismissal
of the prosecution or grant other appropriate relief. It would ap-
pear that this specific rule, enacted to ensure prompt criminal ad-
judication, would be of paramount importance. In reality, how-
ever, Rule 316 has been of little aid to defendants. In Common-
wealth v. Tacconelli25 for example, a trial delay of more than one
year was held not to exceed the "reasonable time" requirement
of Rule 316.26 The ineffectiveness of the rule can be traced to the
fact that the determination of what constitutes "reasonable time"
lies solely within the discretion of the trial court,27 and in imple-
menting this discretion, the courts have for the most part followed
a balancing rationale.28  Therefore, while this rule buttresses the
general constitutional argument, it is not significantly more effec-
tive, for in both cases the balancing criteria must be satisfied.
In employing the balancing test, courts of this state seem to
have placed undue emphasis on two of the Barker criteria.29
First, stringent consideration has been given to the requirement
that the defendant must exhibit a requisite degree of prejudice. It
has been uniformly held that the existence of a mere lapse of what
appears to be an extended period between arrest and trial does not
in itself entitle a defendant to discharge. 0 A defendant must fur-
ther demonstrate that actual prejudice was caused by the delay.
In this case the defendant was not only denied a trial within
a reasonable time without any apparent justifiable reason, but
more importantly, he was deprived of any notice of the filing of
the complaint and issuance of a warrant for a period of over eight
years after the proceedings were instituted.
24. PA. R. CraM. P. 316 provides:
(a) Upon application and a showing that an information has
not been filed or indictment has not been found against a defendant
within a reasonable time, the court may order dismissal of the pros-
ecution or in lieu thereof, make such order as shall be appropriate
in the interests of justice.
(b) The attorney for the Commonwealth shall be afforded
opportunity to show cause why the relief prayed for should not
be granted.
25. 16 Chest. 259 (Pa. C.P. 1968).
26. Id. at 261.
27. Commonwealth v. Kirk, 220 Pa. Super. 115, 119, 283 A.2d 712, 713
(1971).
28. Commonwealth v. Yorgey, 53 Pa. D. & C.2d 240, 243 (C.P. Mont.
1971).
29. See note 4 supra.
30. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
This requirement is made evident in Commonwealth v. Yorgey3 '
where Judge Honeyman speaking for the court stated:
Under Rule 316 this court sees nothing factually to
move it to dismiss the indictments because of any unreason-
able delay in bringing the matter to trial .. particularly
since there is a total absence of any genuine prejudice ac-
cruing to the defendant. 32
Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Stewart"3 the necessity of prejudice
was again emphasized and further bolstered by the court's position
that the burden of proving such prejudice was entirely upon the
defendant.
34
It is conceded that the presence of prejudice should be consid-
ered when discussing speedy trial claims; it should not, however,
be determinative, nor envelop the balancing process of which it is
only a part. As the United States Supreme Court has stressed, po-
tential substantial prejudice is inherent in any prosecutorial de-
lay.3 5 For this reason, prejudice should often be assumed, rather
than continuing to be an indispensa le condti-- fr Affinding of
unconstitutional delay.
The requirement that the accused assert his right to a speedy
trial at an appropriate time is the second balancing factor which
is frequently conclusive.3 6 When considering either a general con-
stitutional argument or contentions based on Rule 316, Pennsyl-
vania courts have previously held that the accused, to avail himself
of these guarantees, must request a trial.3 7 This requirement is
denoted as the demand doctrine and is of particular import.38 The
justification of the demand doctrine is that a speedy trial is a per-
sonal right, which may be waived by action inconsistent with the
assertion of the right. This proposition is evident in Comon-
wealth v. Smiha 39 in which the court ruled that, "where an ac-
cused fails to raise an alleged violation of this constitutional right
. . .he is deemed to have waived this provision of the law.' '40 Si-
lence, regardless of the reason, is considered an inconsistent act and
31. 53 Pa. D. & C.2d 240 (C.P. Mont. 1971).
32. Id. at 245 (emphasis added).
33. 51 Pa. D. & C.2d 560 (C.P. Bucks 1970).
34. Id. at 573.
35. Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 54 (1970).
36. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Sukaly v. Maroney, 201 Pa. Super.
117, 191 A.2d 893 (1963); Commonwealth v. Grant, 121 Pa. Super. 399, 183
A. 663 (1936); Commonwealth v. Brown, 42 Pa. D. & C.2d 95 (C.P. Centre
1966); Commonwealth v. Watson, 16 Pa. D. & C.2d 190 (C.P. Adams 1958).
37. Commonwealth v. Brown, 42 Pa. D. & C.2d 95 (C.P. Centre 1966):
Both the Constitutions of Pennsylvania and of the United States
guarantee a speedy public trial, but an accused, to avail himself
of this guarantee, must request a trial.
Id. at 101.
38. For a more complete discussion of the demand doctrine see Note,
The Lagging Right to a Speedy Trial, 51 VA. L. REv. 1587 (1965).
39. 182 Pa. Super. 232, 126 A.2d 523 (1956).
40. Id. at 236, 126 A.2d at 524.
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therefore serves as a waiver of the right. This position is clearly
untenable, for it places the burden of procuring a prompt trial upon
the accused, rather than the government. Moreover, the doctrine
is based upon a fictional theory of waiver, which is contrary to pres-
ent constitutional standards concerning fundamental rights.
41
The concepts of demand and waiver and the requirement of
prejudice are thus securely entrenched in this state's balancing
process. Arguments couched in constitutional generalities or on the
Rule 316 concept of reasonable time have generally been unsuccess-
ful.42 Therefore, defendants have often attempted to avoid this bal-
ancing process and alternatively have turned to Pennsylvania's
"two-term" rule,43 when seeking speedy trial relief.
Although the "two-term" rule had originally been interpreted
to provide an absolute discharge upon the expiration of two court
terms,4 4 it is now held that discharge merely authorizes release
from prison and has no effect on the authority of the court to pros-
ecute at a later time.45 The futility of this rule, as a statutory guar-
antee for speedy trials was recently expressed in Commonwealth
v. Hamilton.46 In commenting on the inadequacies of the rule, the
41. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938):
It has been pointed out that courts indulge every reasonable pre-
sumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and
do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights. A
waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment
of a known right or privilege.
Id. at 464.
42. See notes 19-29 and accompanying text supra.
43. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 781 (1964) provides in part:
If any person shall be committed for. treason or felony, or
other indictable offense and shall not be indicted and tried some
time in the next term, session of oyer and terminer, general jail
delivery, or other court where the offense is properly cognizable,
or in counties of the second class if any person shall be committed
for treason or felony or other indictable offense and shall not be
indicted and tried within six months in a court where the offense
is properly cognizable, after such commitment, it shall and may
be lawful for the judges or justices thereof, and they are hereby
required on the last day of the term, session or court, or in coun-
ties of the second class within six months of the commitment for
treason or felony or other indictable offense, to set at liberty the
said prisoner upon bail, . . . or in counties of the second class if
such prisoner shall not be indicted and tried within six months
after his or her commitment, unless the delay happen on the appli-
cation or with the assent of the defendant, or upon trial he shall
be acquitted, he shall be discharged from imprisonment . ...
44. Commonwealth v. McBride, 2 Brewster 545 (Pa. 0. & T. Phila.
1868).
45. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Moncak, 375 Pa. 559, 101 A.2d 728
(1954); Commonwealth ex rel. Graham v. Meyers, 194 Pa. Super. 561, 168
A.2d 796 (1961); Commonwealth v. Fox, 53 Pa. D. & C.2d 195 (C.P. Lycom.
1971).
46. 449 Pa. 297, 297 A.2d 127 (1972).
court initially noted that the rule is designed to apply only to com-
mitted defendants awaiting trial, and provides no relief for defend-
ants who are on bail status. 47 Further, the rule is not self-execut-
ing and bail is only obtained by those defendants who have made
a proper demand.48  Upon demand, however, bail has been denied
for numerous reasons, thus, circumventing even this provision of
the rule.49 The final objection to the rule, and its major inade-
quacy, is that it does not require dismissal of the charges5°-which
is the only proper remedy for deprivation of the right to speedy
trial.5 " Since mere discharge is no longer held to satisfy the consti-
tutional guarantee,5" the inanity of the "two-term" rule as a statu-
tory device to insure prompt adjudication is clear.
B. Defendants Incarcerated Within the State
A second group of criminal defendants who commonly present
speedy trial claims are those serving sentences in state penitentiar-
ies on other charges at the time of indictment. It was once felt
that article 1, section 9 of the Pennsylvania constitution53 did not
apply to a defendant already in prison for another offense.54 This
contention has since been dispelled and it is now conceded that,
"the right to a speedy trial is not washed away in the dirty water
of the first prosecution." 55 The once-convicted defendant has the
same options available to him as the defendant waiting his initial
trial; he may base speedy trial claims on either Rule 316, or on
a general constitutional argument. In either event, the accused
must satisfy the criteria of the balancing test, although the require-
ments may be less exacting, particularly with respect to the re-
quirement of prejudice. As illustrated in Commonwealth v. Kirk,56
the courts are more willing to find prejudice when the accused is
imprisoned because the delay in trial not only impairs the convict's
ability to present a defense but also causes "the defendant to lose
the opportunity to serve sentences on local charges concurrently,
with those he is presently serving, thereby creating undue and op-
47. Id. at 304, 297 A.2d at 130-31.
48. Id.
49. Commonwealth v. Moncak, 375 Pa. 559, 562 n.1, 101 A.2d 728, 730
n.1 (1954).
50. Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 449 Pa. 297, 305, 297 A.2d 127, 131
(1972).
51. Commonwealth v. Clark, 439 Pa. 192, 266 A.2d 741 (1970):
[O]nce a trial has been delayed so long that it is no longer"speedy," the proper relief must be dismissal of any further pro-
ceedings in connection with the charged offense, and not the grant
of a trial.
Id. at 195, 266 A.2d at 743.
52. See notes 13-14 and accompanying text supra.
53. See note 1 supra.
54. Commonwealth v. Mattocks, 19 Beaver 61 (Pa. C.P. 1957).
55. Commonwealth v. Clark, 439 Pa. 192, 195, 266 A.2d 741, 743 (1970),
rehearing, 443 Pa. 318, 279 A.2d 41 (1971).




Incarcerated defendants have also sought relief for an alleged
denial of a speedy trial through the use of Pennsylvania's 180-day
rule.58 Since this rule prescribes a specified time period within
which trial must be commenced, it has proven to be of substantial
utility.5 9 Upon closer examination, however, the impotency of the
rule is discoverable. The rule provides that the 180 day period com-
mences to run only after receipt of a written notice requesting
prompt disposition of the case by the district attorney of the county
in which the indictment is pending.60 Thus, the rule contains a
statutory adoption of the demand doctrine and consequently con-
tains all the maladies inherent in demand.6 ' In Commonwealth v.
Sliva6 2 for example, the accused remained incarcerated in a state
prison for nearly four years prior to requesting trial. Trial was
then commenced within the 180 day period and his allegation that
he had been denied a speedy trial was dismissed.6 3 The convicted
defendant, then, although in a substantially better position than
an accused awaiting his initial trial, is also confronted with perplex-
ing difficulties in acquiring a prompt trial.
C. Defendants Incarcerated in Another Jurisdiction
When an accused is imprisoned outside of Pennsylvania, his
ability to obtain a speedy trial is greatly hindered. 64 It was for-
57. Id. at 120, 283 A.2d at 713.
58. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 881 (1964) provides in part:
(a) Whenever any person has entered upon any term of im-
prisonment in any state, county or municipal penal or correctional
institution of this Commonwealth, and whenever during the con-
tinuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in this
Commonwealth any untried indictment against any such prisoner,
he shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty (180) days
after he shall have caused to be delivered to the District Attorney
of the County in which the indictment is pending and the appro-
priate court written notice of the place of his imprisonment and
his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment.
59. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bell, 442 Pa. 566, 276 A.2d 834 (1971);
Commonwealth v. Klimek, 416 Pa. 434, 206 A.2d 381 (1965); Commonwealth
v. Dwyer, 221 Pa. Super. 240, 289 A.2d 735 (1972).
60. See note 58 supra.
61. See notes 38-41 and accompanying text supra.
62. 13 Bucks 234 (Pa. C.P. 1963), aff'd, 206 Pa. Super. 745, 198 A.2d
354 (1964), rev'd on other grounds, 415 Pa. 537, 204 A.2d 455 (1964).
63. 13 Bucks 234 (Pa. C.P. 1963).
64. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 449 Pa. 297, 297 A.2d 127
(1972); Commonwealth v. Bunter, 445 Pa. 413, 282 A.2d 705 (1971); Com-
monwealth v. Ditzler, 443 Pa. 73, 277 A.2d 336 (1971); Common-
wealth v. Clark, 439 Pa. 192, 266 A.2d 741 (1969); Commonwealth v. Wag-
ner, 221 Pa. Super. 50, 289 A.2d 210 (1972); Commonwealth v. Alger, 51
merly held that the speedy trial guarantee did not apply to such
persons and that pending indictments could be held in abeyance.
This position is supported in Commonwealth v. Watson6 ' where it
is noted that, "the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial . ..
was not intended to require the Commonwealth to take active steps
to bring the accused from another jurisdiction for the purpose of
trial."6 6 The foremost rationale advanced in support of this tradi-
tional view rested primarily upon a formalistic conception of sov-
ereignty.7  In short, it was assumed that the prosecution of one
incarcerated in another state could be constitutionally deferred,
since the sovereign seeking to try the prisoner did not have the
power to bring him to trial.6 Further, these delays were justified
upon the theory that such persons, having fled the accusing juris-
diction had waived their right to a speedy trial.69
This reasoning, however, was dramatically rejected by the
United States Supreme Court's holding in Smith v. Hooey.70 In
Smith, the Court proclaimed that the practical demands of the con-
stitutional right to a speedy trial could no longer be submerged
in the doctrinaire concepts of power and authority and indicated
that states had to make diligent efforts to prosecute defendants in-
carcerated in other jurisdictions. 71 The Smith decision was subse-
quently implemented by 'the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Com-
monwealth v. Clark72 and Commonwealth v. Ditzler.7" In addi-
tion, the anachronistic concept of sovereignty had been severely
undermined prior to Smith by the promulgation of the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers.7 4  Thus, through decisional law and
statutory reforms it is now clearly recognized that an accused out-
of-state prisoner retains this constitutional right.
In claiming the denial of a speedy trial, the third class of de-
fendants have usually presented their arguments in one of two
manners. First, relief may be sought through the use of the afore-
mentioned Interstate Agreement on Detainers. 75 This statute, en-
acted by Pennsylvania in 1959, provides a mechanism by which de-
fendants against whom detainers have been lodged may demand
a prompt trial.7 6 Although the prosecution may request that a
Pa. D. & C.2d 686 (C.P. Beaver 1970); Commonwealth v. Watson, 16 Pa.
D. & C.2d 190 (C.P. Adams 1958).
65. 16 Pa. D. & C.2d 190 (C.P. Adams 1958).
66. Id. at 197.
67. See Note, Effective Guaranty of a Speedy Trial for Convicts in
Other Jurisdictions, 77 YALE L.J. 767 (1968).
68. Commonwealth v. Clark, 443 Pa. 318, 323, 279 A.2d 41, 44 (1971).
69. Id.
70. 393 U.S. 374 (1969).
71. Id. at 381.
72. 443 Pa. 318, 279 A.2d 41 (1971). For a complete discussion of this
case see 17 VILL. L. REV. 365 (1972).
73. 443 Pa. 73, 277 A.2d 336 (1971).
74. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1431 (1964).
75. Id.
76. Id. at Article III provides in part:
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party state make an untried defendant available, this request is not
mandatory and is implemented with discretion. 77 Thus, the accus-
ing state only has the burden of bringing to the convict's attention
the existence of the indictment, information, or complaint and of
informing him of his rights under the law. Once notice is accom-
plished, the burden is on the convict to decide whether or not to
make the demand.7 8 In this context, the Interstate Agreement is
;a statutory acceptance of a more realistic version of the demand
doctrine and is therefore of dubious value.79
Although the Interstate Agreement is more efficient than for-
mer procedures that required extradiction 0 to bring out-of-state
prisoners to trial, it is not without shortcomings.8 ' First, the wis-
dom of a policy which permits the accused and the prosecution,
without showing cause, to delay trial because of failure to make
a proper demand is questionable.8 2 Second, the Agreement is only
applicable to signatories of the pact8 3 and its provisions may only
be invoked when a detainer has been lodged with the incarcerating
state. Therefore, a prosecutor wishing to circumvent the rule may
do so by waiting until the prisoner is about to be released before
filing the detainer. The final and most disturbing shortcoming of
the Detainers Act involves the demand rule embodied within the
statute. It is self-evident that such a rule cannot be of any aid
(a) Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprison-
ment in a penal or correctional institute of a party state, and
whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment
there is pending in any other party state any untried indictment,
information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been
lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within
one hundred eighty days after he shall have caused to be delivered
to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prose-
cuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of his im-
prisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of
the indictment, information or complaint....
77. Id. at Article IV provides in part:
(a) The appropriate officer of the jurisdiction in which an
untried indictment, information or complaint is pending shall be
entitled to have a prisoner against whom he has lodged a detainer
and who is serving a term of imprisonment in any party state
made available in accordance with article V .... (emphasis
added).
78. See generally Note, Convicts-The Right to a Speedy Trial and the
New Detainers Statute, 18 RUTGERS L. REv. 82a (1964).
79. See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
80. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 191.1 et seq. (1964). Prior to the
promulgation of the detainers statute, out-of-state convicts could only be
brought to trial by using a complicated extradition procedure.
81. See generally ABA SPEEDY TRIAL STANDARDS § 3 at 33.
82. See 31 U. CHi. L. REv. 535 (1964).
83. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bressler, 194 Pa. Super. 208, 166 A.2d
549 (1960); Commonwealth v. Harmon, 21 Pa. D. & C.2d 251 (C.P. Cumber.
1960).
to a convict who is unaware of the -pending charges against him. 14
Moreover, the defendant may be powerless to assert his right be-
cause of imprisonment, ignorance, or lack of legal advice.8 5 Re-
gardless of the exact reasons, -the inadequacies of the detainer sys-
tem are apparent and it is not surprising that out-of-state prisoners
often present their speedy trial claims in another manner.
In Commonwealth v. Hamilton,6 a general constitutional argu-
ment was the alternative basis for seeking relief. In Hamilton, an
arrest detainer of which the defendant was completely unaware was
lodged with a member state in 1965.87 Nothing further was done
until 1971, when the defendant learned of the detainer and initiated
proceedings to have it removed. Hamilton was then returned to
Pennsylvania where, after indictment, he petitioned to -dismiss the
charges, alleging a denial of his constitutional rights. The Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court using an ad hoc balancing test as was its cus-
tom in speedy trial litigation,"8 granted the requested dismissal.
8 9
The significance of this case is twofold and goes beyond the mere
fact the relief was granted. First, the case is demonstrative of the
inherent inadequacies of the detainer system 0 Of greater signifi-
cance, however, in view of the constitutional argument presented,
is the continued adherence to the balancing criteria by the courts.
Thus, an out-of-state convict, like those two classes of defendants
previously discussed, faces an extreme burden of proof when at-
tempting to attain speedy trial relief.
D. Defendants Awaiting Retrial
Prior to the promulgation of Rule 1100, there existed no statu-
tory or court rule specifying when a criminal defendant had to be
retried after an order granting a new trial. In fact, few defend-
ants had presented speedy trial claims based on a delinquent re-
trial.'1 This phenomenon may be attributed to the fact that
lengthy delays at this point in the litigation are generally uncom-
mon. Nevertheless, a need for reform in this area exists, as is il-
lustrated by the extended retrial -delay considered in Common-
wealth v. Pearson.92 In Pearson, a conviction for robbery was re-
versed and a new trial was granted. More than thirty-two months
84. Commonwealth v. Clark, 443 Pa. 318, 328, 279 A.2d 41, 47 (1971).
85. United States v. Hill, 310 F.2d 601, 603 (4th Cir. 1962).
86. 449 Pa. 297, 297 A.2d 127 (1972).
87. A member state is a signatory of the Interstate Agreement on De-
tainers. In the instant case, the member state involved was South Carolina.
88. See notes 15-29 and accompanying text supra.
89. Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 449 Pa. 297, 309, 297 A.2d 127, 133
(1972).
90. See notes 81-85 and accompanying text supra.
91. See Commonwealth v. Pearson, 450 Pa. 467, 303 A.2d 481 (1973);
Commonwealth v. Werner, 444 Pa. 458, 282 A.2d 258 (1971); Common-
wealth v. Gant, 213 Pa. Super. 427, 249 A.2d 845 (1968).
92. 450 Pa. 467, 303 A.2d 481 (1973).
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passed before the second trial commenced at which the defendant
raised a speedy trial issue through a habeas corpus proceeding. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court examined the defendant's contentions
in the light of the balancing standard, which emphasized the neces-
sity of establishing prejudice.9 3 The court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Eagen, stated:
In the balancing of the foregoing rights, several rele-
vant factors must be considered, and one of the more im-
portant such factors is the presence or lack of prejudice
to the accused as a result of the delay. The instant record
affirmatively discloses Pearson's ability to defend the
charges was not impaired by the delay.9
4
Mr. Justice Roberts, in dissent, noted that good cause had not
been advanced by the Commonwealth to sustain its failure to
promptly retry the appellant and stated that such unnecessary de-
lay constituted in itself a violation of the appellant's constitutional
right to a speedy trial.9 5 The majority, however, unimpressed by
the length of the -delay alone, refused to grant the appellant relief
and further secured the position that unconstitutional delay must
be accompanied by the requisite amount of prejudice.9 6
II. RULE 1100 AND ITS IMPACT
A. Generally
By instituting a specified time period within which trials must
be commenced, Rule 1100 should prove to be of tremendous import
to all persons concerned with prompt criminal adjudication. As
noted by the American Bar Association, "A defendant's right to
speedy trial should be expressed by rule or statute, in terms of days
or months running from a specified event."97 The prime virtue of
this rule is that it will clarify the outer perimeters of the speedy
trial right and therefore simplify a court's determination as to
whether this right has been abridged.9 8 The theory behind a rule
93. Id. at 472, 303 A.2d at 483.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 476, 303 A.2d at 486.
96. See notes 30-35 and accompanying text supra.
97. ABA SPEEDY TRIAL STANDARDS § 2.1 at 14.
98. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). The Barker Court, however,
refused to prescribe a fixed time rule and stated:
[S]uch a result would require this Court to engage in legislative
or rulemaking activity, rather than in the adjudicative process to
which we should confine our efforts. We do not establish proce-
dural rules for the States, except when mandated by the Constitu-
tion.
Id. at 523.
such as Rule 1100 is that it eliminates the vagueness inherent in
any balancing process and it avoids the necessity of a court ascer-
taining a violation of this constitutional right on a case-by-case ba-
sis.99 Thus, a more uniform result should develop as to when this
right has been infringed, and former incongruities should be recti-
fied.
Additionally, the ramifications that a prescribed time period
may have on the criminal justice system in general should be of
substantial social significance.' 00 In this context, Rule 1100 should
stimulate the disposition of a relatively greater percentage of new
cases yearly, especially in the more populous urban areas of the
state.1' 1 The rule should also promote a more expeditious disposi-
tion of criminal cases, which is commonly viewed as having a de-
terrent effect on crime in general. Although the impact of a speedy
trial provision as a deterrent is difficult ito assess in any rigorously
empirical manner, the idea that speed of punishment inhibits crime
has a long-standing intellectual pedigree. 0 2 This proposition was
recently supported by Chief Justice Warren Burger in his State of
the Judiciary Message in 1970:
If ever the law is to have a genuine deterrent effect
on the criminal conduct giving us immediate concern, we
must make dramatic changes. The most simple and most
obvious remedy is to give the courts the manpower and
tools . . . to try criminal cases within sixty days after in-
dictment and then see what happens. I predict it would
sharply reduce the crime rate.
10 3
Admittedly speculative, such statements nevertheless underscore
the social impact of Rule 1100. Further, with the current condition
of extreme congestion and resulting delay in many state courts, it
is not surprising that rationales for the desirability of speedy trials
should shift, from their former personal bias, toward a presumed
social interest in the orderly and effective administration of crim-
inal justice.10 4 As noted in the American Bar Association Stand-
ards, "speedy trial was considered a priority matter not only be-
cause of the defendant's concern ... but also because of the public
interest in seeing that justice is speedily done."' 10 5
99. Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 449 Pa. 297, 308, 297 A.2d 127, 132
(1972).
100. See generally Comment, The Impact of Speedy Trial Provisions:
A Tentative Appraisal, 8 COLUM. J. OF LAW AND SOcIL PROBLEMS 356 (1971-
72).
101. See note 129 and accompanying text infra.
102. See BENTHAM, THEORY OF LFGISLATION 326 (Ogden ed. 1931):
[I]t is desirable that punishment should follow offense as closely
as possible; for its impression upon the minds of men is weakened
by distance, and, besides, distance adds to the uncertainty of pun-
ishment ...
103. 56 A.B.A.J. 929, 932 (1970).
104. See note 100 supra.




In addition to the relatively obtuse aforementioned ramifica-
tions of Rule 1100, it is apparent that this rule will create other
clearly definable results. Initially, it seems manifest that criminal
defendants alleging the denial of a speedy trial, will no longer have
to rely on either the "two-term" rule 0 6 or Rule 316107 as a basis
for their claims. These provisions, as previously noted,10 8 contained
a few archaic elements which weakly purported to prohibit undue
delays at certain pre-trial stages by calling for the dismissal of an
indictment or release of the accused from custody. Since speedy
trial was not delineated in terms of days or months by these rules
and, further, since the meaning of "reasonable time" in Rule 316
rested entirely in the court's discretion,109 these enactments were
relatively ineffective. 110 Rule 1100, in comparison, requires that
trial commence within one hundred and eighty days after a written
complaint is filed, 1 1' and provides the needed specificity that these
other rules lacked, thereby eliminating any need to resort to them
as bases for speedy trial relief.
Similarly, Rule 1100 should also relegate the general constitu-
tional argument formerly used by most criminal defendants to a
secondary role. In the future, it would be ludicrous for a criminally
accused to attempt to satisfy the stringent criteria of the balancing
test when he could assert his claim simply by illustrating the ex-
piration of the specified time period.'1 2 Thus, the complexities of
the ad hoc balancing test and in particular the requirement that
an accused must establish substantial prejudice, 1 3 will no longer
be necessary. Hereinafter, Pennsylvania courts will be unable to
say, "that lapse of time standing alone, is not such unreasonable
delay as to justify dismissal of the prosecution," 1 4 for time will
be the governing basis. Although this position was previously sug-
gested in Commonwealth v. Kirk,"' in which Judge Hoffman noted
that, "such a prolonged 'delay is of itself inherently unfair, and,
106. See note 43 supra.
107. See note 24 supra.
108. See notes 24-28, 43-52 and accompanying text supra.
109. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
110. See notes 27-28 and accompanying text supra.
111. PA. R. CaiM. P. 1100 (a) (2).
112. PA. R. CraM. P. 1100(e) provides, in addition to its one hundred
eighty (180) day time limit, a ninety (90) day time limitation for retrial.
See note 6 at § (e) supra.
113. See notes 31-34 and accompanying text supra.
114. Commonwealth v. Tacconelli, 16 Chester 259, 262 (Pa. C.P. 1968).
115. 220 Pa. Super. 115, 283 A.2d 712 (1971).
as such, a deprivation of speedy justice,""6 the requirement of prej-
udice remained determinative until the promulgation of Rule 1100.
The balancing test and the traditional view that the right to a
speedy trial applies only where the defendant can show that the
delay was prejudicial are thus eliminated by Rule 1100.
In dismissing the use of the balancing test, Rule 1100 will also
cast off the remaining vestiges of the demand doctrine embodied
therein.117 More importantly, however, the rule should have a sub-
stantial effect on the demand requirements presented in both Penn-
sylvania's 180-day rule 18 and in the detainers statute.1 9 As noted
previously, these acts may be employed only by incarcerated de-
fendants; the 180-day rule may be implemented by convicts serving
sentences within the state, while the Detainers Act may be used
by convicts in other jurisdictions. In both of these situations, the
specified time period commences to run from the date of the defend-
ant's request for trial, thus exemplifying the necessity of demand.
Since Rule 1100 rejects the demand doctrine and requires only that
a motion to dismiss be filed before trial, -20 it would seem logical thlat
convicted defendants would now opt for relief under the new rule.
In this manner, defendants would retain the benefits of being
brought to trial within a specified time, while avoiding the require-
ment of making a demand. Whether Rule 1100 may be applied so
mechanistically is questionable.
Although Rule 1100 clearly rejects any prerequisite of prior de-
mand, ,the rule does contain a provision which excludes certain time
periods in determining when trial is to commence.1 2' One such pe-
riod occurs when the defendant (or his attorney) is unavailable.
22
In view of this provision, an obvious inquiry is whether unavail-
ability will be interpreted to include incarceration, thereby making
Rule 1100 no more effective than the former acts. This inquiry
will, however, merit a negative response for two reasons. First,
the comments to the rule specifically cover the issue of unavailabil-
ity and do not suggest that incarceration was intended to be so con-
strued:
[T] he defendant should be deemed unavailable for any
period of time during which he could not be apprehended
because his whereabouts were unknown and could not be
determined by due diligence; or during which he contested
extradition, or a responding jurisdiction delayed or refused
to grant extradition; or during which the defendant was
physically or mentally incompetent to proceed; or during
which the defendant was absent under compulsory process
requiring his appearance elsewhere in connection with
116. Id. at 118, 283 A.2d 713.
117. See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
118. See note 58 supra.
119. See note 76 supra.
120. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 1100(f).
121. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 1100(d).





Since incarceration is not included in this lengthy list of definitions,
the committee members must have intended that convicts be con-
sidered available.
Secondly, even if the commentary list is not to be held totally
inclusive, the position of the United States Supreme Court in
Dickey v. Florida,124 clearly emphasizes that incarceration should
not toll the period within Rule 1100. The Court in Dickey, in ap-
proving the Florida Supreme Court's conclusions, stated that "in-
carceration does not make the accused unavailable, since there have
long been means by which one jurisdiction, for the purpose of a
criminal trial, can obtain. custody of a prisoner held by another. '12 5
Thus, if the Commonwealth knows of the defendant's whereabouts
and none of the other enumerated exclusionary conditions are met,
the defendant will be considered available and the time period for
the commencement of trial will proceed as in all other cases. In
view of this conclusion, state authorities will no longer be able to
simply lodge a detainer and await a defendant's demand before
proceeding to trial.120  Rather, the necessity of demand will be
eliminated and the burden will be on the state to obtain custody
of incarcerated defendants in order to comply with Rule 1100's time
limitations.
C. Possible Harmful Effects
Adhering to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's pronouncement,
"that the proper relief for the denial of a speedy trial must be the
dismissal of any further proceedings and not the grant of a new
trial, ' 127 Rule 1100 provides that the only relief for a violation of its
terms is a dismissal of the charges with prejudice.12 In view of this
provision, it seems reasonable to speculate that strict compliance
with the rule's terms may lead to a mass dismissal of criminal de-
fendants. Since each county has a limited number of court facilities
and personnel, it is only capable of handling a finite number of
cases per term. Therefore, if the influx of criminal defendants ex-
ceeds this saturation point and the congestion results in defendants
not being tried within the prescribed time, dismissals will ensue.
This result, which is at this time merely conjecture, will be most
123. PA. R. CRIM. P. 1100 Comment.
124. 398 U.S. 30 (1970).
125. Id. at 33.
126. See notes 62-63 and accompanying text supra.
127. See note 51 supra.
128. PA. R. Cimrn. P. 1100(f).
probable in the state's more populous urban areas where criminal
case backlogs are most severe 12 9 and will certainly depend upon
the courts' interpretation of the rule's continuance section. 13 0 How-
ever, in view of the rule's relative flexibility and considering the
recent trend limiting the grants of continuances,1 3' it appears that
this provision will be conservatively construed. Thus, the continu-
ance provision will be of minimal value to prosecutors attempting
to extend the specified time limitations.
To clarify the proposition that the rule's continuance provision
will be cautiously applied, it is only necessary to examine General
Court Regulation No. 73-9132 of the Philadelphia County Common
129. See 1971 PILADELPHIA COM. PLEAS AND MUN. CT. ANN. REP., 14.
This report noted:
While there was a reduction of one thousand three hundred and
ninety-four (1,394) cases in the minor felony category there was
an increase during the period in the backlog of homicide cases
of one hundred and thirty (130) bringing the total as of January
1, 1972 of untried homicide cases to four hundred and eighty-eight
(488). Also during this period, i-the number of untried major fel-
onies was increased by four hundred and forty-two (442) cases.
130. See PA. R. CRiM. P. 1100 (c).
131. ABA SPEEY TRIAL STANDARDS § 1.3 at 13 provides:
The court should grant a continuance only upon a showing of good
cause and only for so long as is necessary, taking into account
not only the request or consent of the prosecution but also the
public interest in prompt disposition of the case.
132. PHILADELPHIA COM. PLEAS AND MUN. CT. REG. No. 73-9 provides in
part:
THE FOLLOWING ARE THE ONLY ACCEPTABLE REASONS
FOR CONTINUANCE:
DEFENSE COUNSEL:
1. Conflicting trial engagement in another court with higher
priority. In the event of such engagement a busy slip must be
filed in the appropriate room (s).
2. Incapacitating illness or death in defense counsel's imme-
diate family.




1. Continuance will be granted, at first listing only where the
Commonwealth is not prepared to go forward and the Court is
convinced that diligent effort has been expended by the prosecu-
tion to prepare the case. (For example, an appropriate reason for
continuance might be the absence of necessary reports or records
which must be supplied by other agencies or the absence of a key
witness, where, in either case, diligent effort has been put forth
by the prosecutor to obtain same.)
THERE WILL BE NO FURTHER CONTINUANCES TO DEFENSE
OR PROSECUTION.
The case will go to trial at the second listing with only three ex-
ceptions:
1. In the event that counsel for defendant is not prepared
to proceed to trial or is absent at the second listing, he will be
replaced by court appointment of the voluntary defender who will
be given the option of requesting one continuance of up to 30 days
in order to prepare the case. The defendant shall be advised that
if he does not cooperate with appointed counsel, the case will in
any event go to trial at the next listing ....
2. In the event an appeal from a pre-trial order has been
taken by the Commonwealth; or an appeal has been taken by the
defendant and a stay has been entered by an appellate court, the
case must be continued until the appeal has been determined by
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Pleas Court. This regulation provides, with three limited excep-
tions,8 8 that only one continuance will be granted to either the
defense or prosecution and, if the Commonwealth is not ready
at the second listing, the case will be dismissed. In addition, Regu-
lation 73-9 limits the initial possibility of obtaining a continuance
by specifying the only acceptable reasons for a continuance.8 4 This
type of regulation lends further support to the presumption that
increased dismissals are likely.
As a corrollary to the possibility of an increased number of
dismissals, it is also conceivable that criminal defendants may de-
cide to wait out the time periods, on the chance that their case will
be dismissed, rather than engage in plea bargains. As noted by
one district attorney, speedy trial schemes such as Rule 1100, "may
.turn off the faucet with regard to pleas.' 35 If this phenomenon
ensues, criminal court backlogs will correspondingly increase and
the possibility of dismissals will accordingly be multiplied.8 8  Con-
sequently, it is suggested that Rule 1100 may result in the increased
protection of an individual's constitutional right, although at severe
social costs.
D. Broader Ramifications
Although Rule 1100 will enhance each criminal defendant's con-
stitutional right to a speedy trial and may possibly result in a rash
of criminal case dismissals, the rule's ultimate impact on Pennsyl-
vania's criminal court system should be even more fundamental.
In view of an almost unanimous agreement that the failings of any
criminal justice administration have largely economic roots,18 7 Rule
1100 may provide the necessary stimulus to rectify this financial
plight. By commanding the release of defendants who are not
the appellate court.
3. Continuances other than those set forth above may, in the
interest of justice be allowed only on appproval of the applicable
President Judge or his designee if he is unavailable.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. N.Y. Times, April 30, 1971, at 49, col. 3.
136. The necessity of plea bargaining is illustrated by an examination
of the following data acquired in an interview with Martin H. Belsky, As-
sistant District Attorney (Chief, Adult Prosecution) of the City of Philadel-
phia. (Figures are from Philadelphia County and Municipal Courts):
In 1972 of the 1218 non-rape major cases disposed there were 144
jury trials or 12% disposed by jury trial. In the same year (1972)
of the 206 rape cases disposed there were 44 jury trials or 21%
disposed by jury trial.
137. See generally Note, Speedy Trial Schemes and Criminal Justice
Delay, 57 CORNELL L. Rav. 794 (1971).
brought to trial within the prescribed time, the rule may coerce
those in charge of funds to allocate additional resources for court
administration. Similarly, if there are many dismissals of serious
criminal charges because courts and prosecutors have too many
cases to process, public opinion may encourage state and local gov-
ernments to provide money for additional court facilities and per-
sonnel. Moreover, the courts may themselves initiate proceedings to
acquire additional funds if they find the limitations presented by
the rule to be insatiable due to severe backlogs. 138 This possibility
was recently raised in Commonwealth ex rel. Carrol v. Tate,13 9 in
which President Judge Carroll of the Philadelphia Common Pleas
Court brought a mandamus action against the city's former mayor
to obtain additional funds to operate the courts. In ,the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court's decision, Mr. Chief Justice Bell demanded
.the right for the courts to commandeer funds for their own opera-
tion:
[T]he Judiciary must possess the inherent power to
determine and compel payment of those sums of money
which are reasonable and necessary to carry out its man-
dated responsibilities. . . if it is to be in reality a co-equal,
independent branch of our government.
140
As a result of Rule 1100, then, unreasonable delays in criminal cases
will no longer be justified simply by asserting that the public re-
sources provided by the state are limited and that each case must
wait its turn.14 1 The rule, by placing ithe burden squarely on the
state and on local governments, should ensure that all courts will
have sufficient resources to expeditiously try all criminal cases and,
as a result, the entire criminal court system should benefit.4 2
This proposition, however, is premised on the assumption that
the state legislature will provide necessary funds, if requested. And
yet, due to the economics of state and local governments, this prem-
ise is unfounded, as can be -illustrated by examining an analogous
situation experienced in the state of New York. In New York, a
speedy trial rule very similar to Rule 1100 was proposed14 3 but the
legislature was unwilling to make the necessary allocations that
their courts considered mandatory to efficiently administer the
rule; this New York law did not explicitly exclude general court
138. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 274
A.2d 193 (1971); Leahey v. Farrell, 362 Pa. 52, 66 A.2d 577 (1949).
139. 442 Pa. 45, 274 A.2d 193 (1971).
140. Id. at 52, 274 A.2d at 196 (emphasis added).
141. People v. Ryan, 72 Misc. 2d 990, 340 N.Y.S.2d 321, 325 (1973).
142. See generally E. FRIESEN, E. GALLAS & N. GALLAS, MANAGING THE
COURTS 79 (1971).
143. In New York a speedy trial rule was promulgated by the state's
judicial conference in April, 1971 and was to have become effective on May
2, 1972. 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 29. The rule never took effect, however, because
in April 1972 the state legislature passed a substitute measure explicitly
superseding the Judicial Conference rule.
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congestion as a circumstance that would justify delay. 144 As a re-
sult, the New York legislature passed what is termed a "ready
rule, '14 5 which provides for a dismissal after the prescribed time
period, only if the state is not ready at the termination of this
time.146 A specific time limitation is thus maintained, while the
necessity of acquiring additional funds is eliminated. Such an al-
ternative is certainly undesirable because it condones court conges-
tion and fails to achieve its primary goal-speeding up the judicial
process. It is therefore suggested that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court should neither consider such an option nor amend the rule to
permit court congestion to toll the time period.
CONCLUSION
It must be remembered that the cumulative impact of Rule 1100
will only be determinable in the future when the rule's time limi-
tations, in individual cases, reach itheir terminus dates.147 However,
even at this nascent stage it is manifestly clear that the rule will
have a singularly profound effect. It will accomplish what the ma-
jority of Pennsylvania courts have been unwilling to do under the
constitutional speedy trial guarantee-place an affirmative duty on
the state to bring an accused to justice within a certain and reason-
able time. As a result, Rule 1100 provides clarity where confusion
existed; and since it deals with the fundamental right to a speedy
,trial, such clarity is necessary and certainly long overdue.
ROBERT MAURO
144. See Note, Speedy Trial Schemes and Criminal Justice Delay, 57
CORNELL L. REv. 794, 821 n.135 (1971).
145. N.Y. CPaM. PROC. LAw § 30.30 (McKinney Supp. 1973-74). This
provision provides specific time limits, within which a defendant must be
brought to trial after the commencement of a criminal action. The time
periods vary, according to the degree of the crime charged (i.e. 6 months
when the defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which
is a felony; 60 days when the defendant is accused of one or more offenses,
at least one of which is a misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of impris-
onment of more than three months). Unlike Rule 1100, however, the
only time a charge is dismissed, at the expiration of the time period, is
when the state is not ready to proceed (unprepared). Therefore, if the case
is not tried during the time period, perhaps because of a crowded docket,
but the prosecution is prepared to proceed, the case will not be dismissed.
146. N.Y. CraM. PRoc. LAw § 30.30 (McKinney Supp. 1973-74).
147. PA. R. CraM. P. 1100(a). The expiration of the time period for
the first cases governed by Rule 1100 occurred in April of 1974.
